The Electric Vehicle SPAC Massacre

The electric vehicle sector was the beating heart of the SPAC mania. It was where the biggest promises were made, the wildest valuations were assigned, and the most devastating losses occurred. Of the 12 EV-related companies that went public via SPAC, 5 have filed for bankruptcy. The average return for the sector: -94.3%.

That's not a correction. That's not a bear market. That's annihilation. For every $100 invested in EV SPACs at their merger price, the average investor has $12 left. And many have nothing at all.

The Body Count

Here is every EV-related SPAC that went bankrupt, sorted by peak market capitalization destroyed:

Total peak market capitalization destroyed across EV SPAC bankruptcies: $60.2B.

Nikola: The $28 Billion Fraud

Nikola was the SPAC that defined the era. At its peak in June 2020, the company was worth $28 billion — more than Ford at the time — despite having never built a single truck. It had no factory, no supply chain, no revenue, and no viable product. What it had was a charismatic founder named Trevor Milton and a promotional video of a truck seemingly driving under its own power.

The truck, as Hindenburg Research later revealed, was rolling downhill. It had no engine, no drivetrain, no propulsion of any kind. It was a prop on an incline, filmed at an angle to simulate forward motion. Milton was subsequently convicted of securities fraud and sentenced to four years in federal prison, plus a $125 million SEC settlement.

Nikola filed for bankruptcy on February 19, 2025 — 56 months after going public. The company destroyed$28.0B in peak market value.

Fisker: Second Time's Not the Charm

Henrik Fisker had already bankrupted one electric car company — Fisker Automotive — in 2013. So naturally, Wall Street gave him another shot via SPAC. Fisker Inc. went public through a SPAC merger in 2020, peaked at a market cap of $8.4B, and filed for bankruptcy on June 17, 2024 — 44 months later. The Ocean SUV had severe quality issues, dealership relationships collapsed, and the company ran out of cash.

Lordstown Motors: Fake Orders, Real Losses

Lordstown Motors claimed 100,000 pre-orders for its Endurance electric pickup truck. Hindenburg Research investigated and found the orders were largely fictional — many came from entities with no ability to purchase fleets of trucks. The SEC investigated. The CEO resigned. Peak market cap: $5.0B. Bankrupt: June 2023.

Canoo: Zero Revenue at Death

Canoo's SPAC story is remarkable for its purity: the company went public via SPAC in 2020, spent years burning through cash on a vehicle it never meaningfully produced, and filed for bankruptcy in January 2025 with effectively zero revenue. Peak market cap: $2.0B. Months public: 50. The company generated exactly zero dollars in vehicle sales.

Proterra: The Bus That Stopped

Proterra made electric buses — a product that actually exists and serves a real market. But the SPAC valuation was absurd for the scale of the business. Peak market cap: $3.7B. The company couldn't scale production fast enough, faced supply chain issues, and filed for bankruptcy in August 2023, just 25 months after going public.

ELMS: Speed Record to Bankruptcy

Electric Last Mile Solutions holds the ignominious record for the fastest SPAC-to-bankruptcy timeline. The company went public via SPAC in 2021 and filed for Chapter 7 liquidation just 12 months later, in June 2022. Peak market cap: $1.4B. The company was investigated for insider trading by its own executives before the merger closed.

Lion Electric: The Canadian Casualty

Lion Electric, a Canadian manufacturer of electric school buses and trucks, went public via SPAC in 2020. It had actual products and actual revenue — more than most on this list. But the valuation was still wildly inflated. Peak market cap: $2.0B. Filed for bankruptcy December 2024, 49 months after going public.

Why Did EV SPACs Fail So Catastrophically?

The electric vehicle sector was particularly vulnerable to the SPAC model for several interconnected reasons:

1. Capital intensity: Building cars requires billions in factory investment, supply chain development, and tooling. SPAC trusts of $200-500 million were utterly insufficient for the task. Most EV SPACs needed to raise additional capital post-merger, diluting shareholders further.

2. The Tesla mirage:Every EV SPAC pitch deck referenced Tesla's market cap as a comparable. This was delusional. Tesla had a decade head start, a functioning factory, a charismatic CEO, and had actually solved the hard problems of manufacturing at scale.

3. Forward projections: Because SPACs could include forward-looking projections (unlike traditional IPOs), every EV company projected billions in future revenue. Not one delivered. The average EV SPAC achieved less than 10% of its projected revenue within two years of the merger.

4. No differentiation:Most EV SPACs were chasing the same market (electric pickups, delivery vans, or passenger vehicles) with similar technology and no competitive moat. The market couldn't support 25 new EV companies simultaneously.

The Survivors

Not every EV SPAC went to zero. Lucid Motors, backed by Saudi Arabia's sovereign wealth fund, is still operating (though down roughly 50% from merger price and hemorrhaging cash). But Lucid is the exception that proves the rule: it survived because a government with unlimited capital chose to keep it alive, not because the SPAC model worked.

The EV SPAC massacre isn't just a story about bad companies. It's a story about what happens when Wall Street's incentive machine meets retail investor enthusiasm and an industry that requires patience, capital, and execution that the SPAC timeline simply doesn't allow.

Data sourced from SEC filings, bankruptcy court records, and market data tracked by SPACGraveyard. Sector classification based on primary business description at time of SPAC merger.